Ukrainian military officials leave their posts, escorted by Russian forces
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 18 that he signed a treaty with Crimean leaders to annex the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Putin claimed earlier in March that pro-Russian self-defense forces (not Russian military units), entered the Crimean peninsula and established control over government buildings, airfields and the strategically significant Sevastopol port on the Black Sea. The action comes after months of anti-government protests in Ukraine culminated in the ousting of their Moscow-backed President, Viktor Yanukovych. In response, the US, EU, and other Western governments have condemned the military incursion, suspended Russia’s membership in the G8, and have placed economic sanctions against Russian officials with further measures pending. Ukraine has pulled its forces out of the peninsula to avoid military confrontation, leaving the peninsula and over two million Crimean people under Russian control.
Direct warfare between Ukraine and Russia is very unlikely and would be devastating for both; Ukraine would be affected more in terms of loss of sovereign authority and Russia in terms of tarnishing what legitimacy and reputation it has left. War is an option that neither side wants.
What is more likely to occur is a quasi-controlled Crimea territory under Russian control that deepens the political and economic divide between Russia and the West. More trade agreements and political summits will be either cancelled or postponed, and effective cooperation in the near future will be largely undermined by the Crimean issue. Putin has staked too much on Crimea to withdraw quickly, and the West cannot let the controversy go unpunished else leaders will receive criticism for appearing acquiescent and weak. The focus on the conflict between Russia and the West will likely center on saving face rather than direct and significant action from this point forward.
Timeline of Key Events
November 21, 2013: Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych refuses to sign a trade agreement with the European Union in favor of increased ties to Russia, sparking national outcry
November 2013 – February 2014: Anti-government rallies in Ukraine demanding political and economic reform result in massive rallies, the occupation of government buildings, and violent clashes between security forces and demonstrators
February 20: The deadliest clashes yet result in over 70 deaths as government snipers fire on protesters
Late February: Ousted former president Yanukovych flees to Russia, early elections are scheduled in Ukraine, and Russian armed forces begin to take control of military installations in the Crimean peninsula. Anti-government protests end after Yanukovych’s departure
Early March: US, EU and other international governments condemn Russian intervention in Ukraine and begin issuing economic sanctions and cancelling agreements with Russia
March 4: Russian President Vladimir Putin claims he has reserved the right to protect citizens in eastern Ukraine but vowed force would only be used as a last resort
March 16: A referendum taken in the Crimea shows overwhelmingly support to leave Ukraine and join Russia
March 18: President Putin signs a treaty with Crimean leaders to annex the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Federation
Despite the strong rhetoric against Putin’s actions, producing a tangible deterrent to Russia could potentially cost the West just as much as it would affect Russia. In today’s globalized economy, the reality of options that the US and the rest of the international community can implement effectively is limited. Actions such as suspending Russia from the G8, cancelling trade agreements, and organizing additional military exercises are more important in a symbolic sense than a practical one.
European nations are too highly dependent on Russian natural gas, and international business leaders don’t want a war over the Crimea which would undercut their profits. The sanctions and cancelled summits thus far have been targeted on Russian economic and political leaders believed to be profiting on the Crimean crisis and more have been promised, but the impact will assuredly not coalesce Russia into doing an about face on the issue.
Crimea has a population of about 2.3 million, the majority of whom are ethnically Russian and speak Russian though almost a quarter of the population are ethnically Ukrainian. There is an additional Crimean Tatar minority which has returned to the peninsula after they were forcibly deported in WW2. The Tatars have expressed their fears of increased persecution under Russian authority and many have fled further west into Ukraine. Thus clearly the ramifications of the intervention have angered more than just the world at large, it has had a real impact on stirring up past grievances.
The closest comparison to what is happening in Crimea at present is the reaction to the conflict over South Ossetia, which has been under de facto control of Russian and South Ossetian authorities since the 2008 Georgian War. Similarly to Crimea, South Ossetians passed an unofficial referendum that voted for independence the ruling government did not recognize, and Russian military forces occupied the area in the name of protecting their civilians. The vast majority of the international community condemned the incursion, and in addition to Russia only four other countries (two of which are tiny Pacific island nations) recognized South Ossetia as a sovereign state.
What is next for Russia and Crimea depends on how Putin and Western leaders manage their leverage over one another. Neither stands to gain significantly from isolating the other side economically or even politically, but simultaneously backing down would only serve to embolden the competition. Crimea will continue to be officially considered part of Ukraine though the reality that it is under Russia’s wing will serve as a wrench in negotiations for some time.
The majority of the Crimean people voted in favor of joining Russia, and those have effectively had their wish granted. Excluding select elements of Russia’s leadership, few others stand to gain, and even then in the long run it is hard to tell if the benefits will outweigh the costs of the decision to intervene.
Midwest Diplomacy 