(Part I on the background of North Korea can be found here)
North Korea, (the DPRK) is willing to reject modern globalization and completely separate itself off from the rest of the world in most aspects of society. As a result, the truth on the ground in North Korea is one of, if not the most, difficult to come across in the world for any sovereign state today. The saber-rattling and constant propaganda within the DPRK isolates their people and their government from the outside world to an alarming degree so predicting the next course of action that North Korea will take may seem like a fruitless endeavor. There is no simple and straightforward way to resolve the humanitarian crisis that has plagued the north half of the Korean Peninsula since the end of World War II. Nonetheless, a better understanding of recent North Korea history coupled with continued engagement, diplomacy, and patience can serve to unravel the options in how best to approach the Hermit Kingdom.
The Six-Party Talks involving North Korea, South Korea, US, Japan, China, and Russia that began in 2003 have fallen far short of their goals of stopping or even slowing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. North Korea walked out of the negotiations in 2009 and has refused to return to the table unless the talks begin without preconditions, which is unacceptable to the other participants. North Korea previously made gestures toward denuclearization, but each time soon after reverted to moves showing they were clearly continuing to advance their programs covertly or overtly. In total there have been three confirmed nuclear tests conducted in the DPRK (2006, 2007, and 2013), and estimates on their stockpile of nuclear weapons vary, though most reports cite between several to two dozen. Critical to remember is that separate from the amount of nuclear material and warheads available is the ballistics systems, which North Korea consistently has invested in improving.
Though virtually no aid has been given to the DPRK from the United States since the former walked out of denuclearization negotiations in 2009, between 1995 and 2008 the US gave North Korea over $1.3 billion in foreign assistance; over 50% in food aid, and about 40% in energy assistance. Since 2009, nearly all other countries with the exception of China have given minimal aid. The DPRK continues to suffer devastating levels of widespread malnutrition and food shortages, but even when aid was high the unequal distribution failed to adequately address the problems. The fact that Kim Jong-un and his predecessors have ignored the economic infrastructure and treated the well-being of the common citizen as second rate is clear. However, the balance between turning a blind eye to the humanitarian crisis, and outright exacerbating the problems are unclear.
Though perhaps the least impactful on policy directly, sports and cultural exchanges have opened interesting windows into North Korea and Kim Jong-un. When Dennis Rodman and members of the Harlem Globetrotters visited North Korea for a trip which included a game with national players, it drummed up considerable discussion and no shortage of controversy. The strange relationship between North Korean leaders’ love for American basketball and western consumerism (Kim Jong-il reportedly was the largest buyer of Hennessy) underlines a kind of hypocrisy in dealing with the outside world. While only very few are exposed to foreign culture, if that double standard of political opposition, but indirect adoration can be highlighted then perhaps changing North Korean’s perspectives on their situation could be possible. While Dennis Rodman may have accomplished little more than inflating Kim Jong-un’s ego, other individuals like Rob Springs with Global Resource Services, who has devoted time and resources to humanitarian causes within the DPRK have been able to make more positive, though very limited, change outside of elite circles.
Attempting to normalize relations or interact within North Korea without care can have the consequences of legitimizing the leadership and ignoring or setting aside the wider problems the country faces on a daily basis. The limited projects and NGOs from the West that are allowed to engage with North Koreans directly, such as the GRS and the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology should be further explored, while being aware of the opportunity for the government to manipulate such positive exchanges.
Dealing with North Korea directly, either via economic/military pressure and intimidation, or through incentives and aid, has thus far proven unsuccessful in making lasting large-scale progress. Despite that, the US, South Korea, and West should continue to monitor and track the military threats and nuclear ambitions of North Korea, while also keeping relevant avenues of dialogue open if the DPRK will return to negotiations. Part of the reason the DPRK has found relative success by its own right in shaking its fist at the outside world is because it has done so often spontaneously. Small scale aid and projects through private groups have been able to achieve limited goals, and working to help North Korean citizens directly could help chip away at decades of mistrust.
Approaching the DPRK from not just a macro level, but also through smaller initiatives opens up more possibilities for the people of North Korea to interact with the outside world. The Kim Jong-un regime is firmly in control, though hopefully in time there are real alternatives available for the North Korean people to make their own decisions.